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There is robust consensus among political scientists, congressional observers, and in 
Congress that the First Branch’s internal staffing capacity is at historic, dangerous lows. This 
paper addresses staffing capacity in the U.S. House of Representatives and the three primary 
congressional support offices: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), Governmental Accountability Office (CBO). In recent decades, political actors, 
penurious budgeting, and voter animosity have degraded needed expertise.  Such actions 
include reduced or frozen staffing numbers and pay and poor working conditions. The result is 
frequent staff burnout and turnover. Bright but inexperienced staff struggle to manage an 
portfolio of policy issues in which they cannot possibly have a working proficiency. These staff 
turn to lobbyists inevitably join the “Influence Industry.” The executive branch staffing, 
relatively, is substantial. Congress struggles to exercise oversight over federal agencies, in large 
part, due to a mismatch of resources. Lawmakers face legislative gridlock and the lawmaking 
they do undertake is often overly responsive to the wishes of K Street. 
This capstone proposes a Residency Program to onboard an annual cohort of 300 staff 
into the U.S. House and three support agencies who are experienced, knowledgeable and 
credentialed in the fields of public policy and administration. It draws inspiration from similar 
and established programs. The program would annually onboard 150 recent graduates of 
masters programs and 150 recent graduates of doctoral programs. The programs must be 
accredited. The candidates must possess at minimum three years’ executive branch experience. 
The Residents would be paid a living wage and work 12 months. The goal is to find the Residents 
a permanent job in Congress, hopefully the House or three offices. There would be no job 
guarantee. By the end of 2025, the annual cohorts of 300 Residents could represent as much as 
19.11 percent of the House, or 13.6 percent of the House and three support offices combined.  
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TO:   Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
FROM:  Sara Buettner-Connelly 
DATE:   January 1, 2019 
SUBJECT:  The Policy and Public Management Residency Program - A Proposal to Restore 
Staffing Capacity in the U.S. House, CBO, CRS, and GAO 
 
ACTION-FORCING EVENT 
The 116th Congress begins this week.  As the anticipated Speaker of the new Democratic 
Majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, you will oversee all aspects of the political and 
legislative agenda, including staffing capacity.  
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The U.S. House lacks staffing of sufficient levels, expertise, and experience. Inadequate staffing 
has resulted in a weak and dysfunctional chamber.  This chamber is overly reliant on lobbyists, 
especially those representing business interests. The number and complexity of policy 
challenges have ballooned while the size and expertise 
of congressional staff have plateaued or shrank. Many 
rank-and-file Representatives feel unable to influence 
legislating other than merely implementing the agendas 
of the Majority party leadership.  
From 1975 to 2015, staffing levels in the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the 
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) declined by 45 percent.1 The numbers of staff serving on 
House committees and personal offices have also 
fallen from 1977 to 2016.2 This has transpired despite 
the growth in the U.S. population and growth in the 
number and complexity of policy challenges faced by 
lawmakers. By law, House personal offices are 
permitted to have no more than eighteen permanent 
staff. This statute has remained unchanged since 
1975.3 The Member Representational Allowance 
(MRA), which funds Member office expenses, 
including staff salaries, has stagnated or declined in 
recent decades.4 The American public broadly dislikes 
Congress5 and believes it is over-staffed and bloated, 
rendering lawmakers hesitant  to increase funding.6  
 Overall, the total number of House staff 
plateaued or shrank in recent decades, including in the House Member Offices. In the mid-90s, 
the number of committee staff dropped (and never recovered). Simultaneously, the number of 
staff working for Officers and Officials7 increased.8  
                                                          
1 Molly Reynolds, “Vital Statistics on Congress: Congressional staff and operating expenses,” Brookings Institution, last modified 
March 4, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/. 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, 
and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by Eric R. Petersen, R43947 (September 13, 2016). 
3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Salaries and Allowances: In Brief, by Ida A. Brudnick, 
RL30064 (2018). 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 “Congressional Job Approval: 1975-2019 Gallup Polling,” Gallup, Inc., Last modified 2019, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx. 
6 Lee Drutman, “People think Congress is increasing its staff. So Congress might as well actually do it,” Vox Media, August 21, 2015, 
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2015/8/21/9184197/congressional-staff-salaries.  
7 In 2016, House officers included the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and Chaplain. Officials included staff in 
the offices of Parliamentarian, Interparliamentary Affairs, Law Revision Counsel, Legislative Counsel, General Counsel, Inspector 
General, Emergency Preparedness and Planning Operations, and House Historian.  
8 CRS, House of Representatives Staff Levels (R43947), 5. 
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A 2017 Congressional Management Foundation survey inquired of senior congressional 
staff their opinions on staffing.  Respondents 
reported that 83 percent said that it is 
“important” that staff have sufficient 
knowledge, skills, and abilities, but that only 15 
percent do.9 A further 81 percent stated that 
access to high-quality, nonpartisan, policy 
expertise is ‘very important’ but only 24 percent 
were satisfied with the status quo. Only 11 
percent were satisfied with the level of capacity, 
including staffing and expertise, so that 
Congress could “perform its role in 
democracy.”10  
 A 2010 Sunlight Foundation study examined Hill staffing trends since 1979. It concluded 
that during that time staff turnover grew significantly and tenure decreased. Among the likely 
principal causes was pay.11 For example, there exists a significant pay gap between Hill salaries 
and incomes derived from equivalent jobs in the private sector. On average, House staffer 
salaries have remained stagnant during the period examined. In 2012, the median wage of a K 
Street lobbyist was $179,667. Those with a background in government earned a median salary 
of $300,000.12 Congressional staff generally work very long and unpredictable hours in cramped 
                                                          
9 Kathy Goldschmidt, “State of the Congress: Staff Perspectives on Institutional Capacity in the House and Senate,” The Congressional 
Management Foundation, 2017, http://congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/cmf-state-of-the-congress.pdf.  
10 Ibid., 9. 
11 Daniel Schuman, “Keeping Congress Competent: Staff Pay, Turnover, And What It Means for Democracy,” Sunlight Foundation, 
December 21, 2010, https://sunlightfoundation.com/2010/12/21/keeping-congress-competent-staff-pay-turnover-and-what-it-
means-for-democracy/.    
12 Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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offices with minimal to nonexistent job security.13 A 2010 study for the House Chief 
Administrative Office determined that only 20 percent of House Legislative Directors had their 
current role for more than six years, and less than half for more than three years.14 The study 
further determined that less than half of Legislative Directors and Chiefs of Staff attained 
education above a bachelor’s degree. Legislative Directors advise the Member on all policy 
areas, including the development of legislative initiatives and policy positions, and manages all 
congressional staff. The Chief of Staff is the Member’s chief policy advisor who oversees all 
policy objectives and directs the operations and budget of the Member office.  
The Sunlight Foundation also determined that fewer staffers serve in policymaking roles, 
with a shift toward constituent services. In 1985, 62 percent of personal office staff resided in 
the Capitol Office. In 2005 that number was 49 percent. Staffing has also shifted to 
communications positions. A 2018 R Street policy study noted that “communications aides on 
House panels has increased by about 40 percent since 2001, while the number of policy-focused 
aides has stagnated.”15 This similar trend has occurred among committee staff.16 For lawmakers, 
committees constitute the locus of policymaking and where they develop policy expertise.17  
The shift toward constituent services is likely driven in part by the proliferation of 
correspondence reaching lawmakers. For example, in 2012, the American public communicated 
                                                          
13 Congressional Management Foundation, Working in Congress: The Staff Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CMF, 1994), 
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/CMF-Working-in-Congress.pdf.  
14 U.S. House of Representatives, Chief Administrative Office, 2010 House Compensation Study (Washington, D.C.: The Sunlight 
Foundation, 2010), 
http://assets.sunlightfoundation.com.s3.amazonaws.com/policy/staff%20salary/2010_house_compensation_study.pdf.  
15 Anthony Marcum, Casey Burgat, and C. Jarrett Dieterle, “Policy Study No. 155: How Young Lawyers Can Help Restore 
Congressional Capacity,” R Street Institute, 2018, https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Final-No.-155.pdf.   
16 Timothy LaPira and Herschel Thomas, Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation 
of Interests (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017).  
17 Casey Burgat and Charles Hunt, “Why was the Peter Strzok hearing such a circus? Because Congress wanted it that way,” The 




to Congress to express opposition to the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) bill via 8 million calls and 
4 million emails.18  
Non-partisan congressional support offices like the CBO, CRS, and GAO have likewise 
endured shrinking budgets and staffing. In addition, their work products regularly face derision 
and threats from the lawmakers they seek to inform. In 2012, the CRS released a report which 
concluded that top tax rates do not correlate with economic growth. Lawmakers that disliked 
the report pressured the CRS to retract it, despite repeated protestations from the CRS 
economic team.19 In the summer of 2017, the CBO concluded that repeal of Obamacare would 
cause 23 million people to be uninsured. House Freedom Caucus members responded by 
threatening to cut CBO staffing by 37 percent.20  
Meanwhile, legal and policy 
challenges have grown in size and 
complexity in recent decades. The Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) in 1970 was 116 
volumes comprised of 56,720 pages. By 
2014, the CFR was 175,268 pages and 236 
volumes.21 The average number of pages 
per enacted law has also grown over six 
times longer—a figure that understates the increasing length due to the recent proliferation of 
                                                          
18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, “When The Net Went Dark: SOPA, PROTECT IP and the Birth of an Internet Movement,” BTLJ 
(blog), February 14, 2012,  http://btlj.org/2012/02/when-the-net-went-dark-sopa-protect-ip-and-the-birth-of-an-interent-
movement/.  
19 Jonathan Weisman, “Nonpartisan Tax Report Withdrawn After G.O.P. Protest,” The New York Times, November 1, 2012, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/questions-raised-on-withdrawal-of-congressional-research-services-report-on-tax-
rates.html?ref=business&_r=1&.  
20 Amanda Becker, “Republicans in House push for Congressional Budget Office cuts,” Reuters, July 24, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-cbo/republicans-in-house-push-for-congressional-budget-office-cuts-
idUSKBN1A92KN.  




one or two-page bills intended to name a building or recognize achievement.22 Congressional 
scholar Lee Drutman observed that “[t]o effectively make new law, one must understand 
existing law.” He concluded that Hill staff broadly lacked the necessary knowledge and expertise 
to address the growth and complexity of modern laws and policy issues.23  The executive 
branch, which Congress must oversee, has also grown. In 1940 the Executive branch employed 
699,000 personnel. However, in 2014, that number was 2.079 million.24 A CRS report which 
included military and postal staffing reported over 4 million employees.25 An additional study 
determined that with the inclusion of all contractors and grantees, up to 9 million people 
worked for the federal government.26 However, there are only 17,272 professional staff in 
Congress to oversee this sprawling expanse of workers.27 Federal expenditures have also 
increased. In 1976, federal outlays were $1.3 trillion in today’s dollars.  In 2017, outlays were 
$3.3 trillion and expected to continue to grow annually.28  
Additionally, as concluded by a 2018 study, each House Appropriations staff handles 52 
percent more federal funding than they did sixteen years ago.29 The study found that this lack of 
capacity has resulted in a Congress unable to oversee the $4 trillion appropriated annually. The 
study found that a direct consequence is a proliferation in recent years of short-term and 
omnibus funding measures, which are projected to continue under the status quo.  
                                                          
22 Christopher Beam, “Paper Weight: The health care bill is more than 1,000 pages. Is that a lot?,” The Slate Group, August 20, 2009, 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/08/is-1000-pages-long-for-a-piece-of-legislation.html.  
23 Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, “Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself,” The Atlantic, March 10, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/when-congress-cant-think-for-itself-it-turns-to-lobbyists/387295/.   
24 U.S. Office of Personnel Management,  Historical Federal Workforce Tables, (Washington, D.C.: OPM, Last updated September 30, 
2019), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/historical-
tables/executive-branch-civilian-employment-since-1940/.  
25 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Federal Workforce Statistics Sources: OPM and OMB, by Julie Jennings 
and Jared C. Nagel (March 25, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf.  
26 Paul C. Light, “The True Size of Government,” The Volker Alliance, October 2017, 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20Government.pdf.  
27 Elaine C. Kamarck, “A Congressional Oversight Office: A proposed early warning system for the United States Congress,” The 
Brookings Institution, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Congressional-Oversight.pdf.  
28 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables: Table 1.3—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in 
Current Dollars, Constant (FY 2009) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940–2023 (The White House), accessed March 3, 2019, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.  
29 Casey Burgat and Ryan Dukeman, “Human capital and institutional decline in congressional appropriations committees,” R Street 
Institute, 2018, https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Rstreet-Human-Capital-Institutional-Decline_v2.pdf.   
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 While legislative staff capacity has withered, 
lobbying and pressure group size and sophistication 
have flourished. In 1983, lobbying efforts expended 
$200 million in today’s dollars. That amount surged 
to $1.82 billion in 2010 and $3.31 billion in 2012.30 In 
2015, Ezra Klein and Lee Drutman announced a grim 
milestone. They stated that corporations spent more 
on congressional lobbying than taxpayers spent 
funding Congress: “Corporations now spend about $2.6 billion a year on reported lobbying 
expenditures – more than the $2 billion we spend to fund the House ($1.16 billion) and Senate 
($820 million)” in the article,.31  This influence industry mainly represents business rather than 
issues of “public interest.” In 2012, 78 percent of Washington, D.C. lobbyists served business 
interests.32  
The broad conclusion among congressional observers and experts is that congressional 
offices –especially staffers–are ill-equipped to handle the volume and complexity of issues they 
face and resultingly turn to lobbyists for 
expertise.33 Timothy LaPira, a professor at 
James Madison University, studied lobbying 
disclosure data and wrote the book, 
Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, 
Private Influence, and the Unequal 
                                                          
30 Robert Reich, Supercapitalism (New York: Knopf, 2007), 134. 
31 Ezra Klein, “Corporations now spend more lobbying Congress than taxpayers spend funding Congress,” Vox Media, July 15, 2015, 
https://www.vox.com/2015/4/20/8455235/congress-lobbying-money-statistic.  
32 Timothy M. LaPira, “How Much Lobbying Is There in Washington? It’s DOUBLE What You Think,” Sunlight Foundation, November 
25, 2013, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/11/25/how-much-lobbying-is-there-in-washington-its-double-what-you-think/.  
33 Rollcall Staff, “Congress Needs More and Better-Paid Staff,” CQ Roll Call, March 21, 2016,  
https://www.rollcall.com/news/opinion/congress-needs-better-paid-staff. 
Source: The Business of 
America is Lobbying, by Lee 
Drutman. 
Source: The Business of 




Representation of Interests. He concluded that expertise that once existed in Congress has 
shifted to K Street. Resultantly, Congress is now heavily dependent on K Street. LaPira 
demonstrates that a fundamental cause for this shift was the reduction of congressional staff 
size and salaries.34 He stated that “There is a vacuum in Congress right now for that expertise, 
and we see not only lobbyists but particularly revolving-door lobbyists filling that vacuum.”  
The consequences fall on the American public. LaPira concluded that revolving-door 
lobbyists primarily work to ensure their clients avoid congressional action that could harm 
profits.35 A result is “policy drift.” When existing law is rarely updated, it is often considered a 
form of gridlock, namely, ‘policy drift.’ A frequent cause is intense lobbying, often by narrow 
interests, at key legislative veto points.36 When staffers rely on lobbyists for policy expertise, 
they learn from an information source 
with an agenda. Historically, this capacity 
existed within Congress. In a 2007 survey, 
two-thirds of staffers described lobbyists 
as “necessary to the process” and as 
either “collaborators” or “educators.” 
Staffers also frequently referred to 
lobbyists as “partners.”37 Lobbyists now 
regularly provide policy analysis and reports,38 write legislation39, speeches40 and talking 
                                                          
34 LaPira and Thomas, Revolving Door Lobbying, 14. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the 
Middle Class (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2010). 
37 The Policy Council, “Changing Of The Guard: 2007 State Of The Industry For Lobbying And Advocacy,” 60-61 (2007). 
38 Kevin M. Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004). 
39 Eric Lipton and Ben Protess, “Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills,” The New York Times, May 23, 2013, 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/banks-lobbyists-help-in-drafting-financial-bills/.  
40 Nicholas W. Allard, “Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right,” Stanford Law 
and Policy Review 23 (2008), https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=faculty.  
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points,4142 letters to Federal agencies;43 they pretend to be average citizens writing their 
lawmakers44 or letters to the editor,45 produce whip counts and seek out cosponsors.46 
Lobbyists provide this service to inform lawmakers but also to bolster an agenda. But they 
cannot completely replicate the work of earlier Congresses with strong internal capacity. 
For instance, another consequence of low staffer capacity is that Representatives 
struggle to conduct thorough oversight, including regulating industries. In short, lawmakers lack 
preparation. Former Representative John Dingell stated that “In the old days, the member used 
to know more than any witness from the outside that came before the committee. Today they 
do not. Members do not even understand the issues. They do not even ask questions that are 
relevant.”47  The Zuckerberg hearings in April 2018 showcased for the American public 
lawmakers unprepared with basic knowledge about the subject matter. Indeed, one lawmaker 
asked Zuckerberg for his suggestions for regulating his own company48. This exposed that 
expertise remains within business industries, rather than in legislative offices, as in times past. In 
fact, in recent times Congress regularly asks or permits the private sector to establish and 
conduct their own oversight.49 Such self-regulating will inevitably favor profitability rather than 
the public interest.50  
                                                          
41 Lee Fang and Nick Surgery, “Cable Industry Lobbyists Write Republican Talking Points on Net Neutrality,” The Intercept, May 23, 
2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/05/23/net-neutrality-ncta/.  
42 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, January 14, 2014). 
43 Aubree Eliza Weaver and Daniel Lippman, “United behind Illinois delegation’s 'Open Skies' letter,” Politico Influence, Politico, July 
6, 2017, https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/politico-influence/2017/07/06/united-behind-illinois-delegations-open-skies-letter-
221195.  
44 Rona Kobell, “Gas lobby campaign produces confusion,” The Baltimore Sun, June 6, 2013, 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2003-06-06-0306060023-story.html.  
45 Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying, 40. 
46 Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” The American Political Science Review  100, no. 1 (2006): 
69-84, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27644332.  
47 Paul Glastris and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “The Big Lobotomy: How Republicans Make Congress Stupid,” Washington Monthly, 
June-July 2014, https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaug-2014/the-big-lobotomy/.  
48 Lee Drutman, “What the Facebook hearings reveal about corporate power in Washington,” Vox Media, April 4, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/4/16/17244074/facebook-hearing-zuckerberg-corporate-power-washington. 
49 Amit Narang, “Corporate self-regulation is failing,” The Hill, March 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-
administration/436328-corporate-self-regulation-is-failing.  
50 Ibid.  
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In sum, staffing levels and salaries have plateaued or decreased in committees, personal 
offices and non-partisan offices (CRS, CBO, and GAO). Personal office staffing has shifted from 
policy to constituent services and communications. There has also been decline in the 
experience, education and expertise that congressional staff, especially leadership, possess. This 
is despite the growth in size and complexity of the challenges posed by the executive branch, 
pressure groups, and policy challenges of modern society. Meanwhile, the volume and 
complexity of legislative work have grown exponentially. Lobbyists have stepped in to fill the 
void, but they bring their agendas. Lawmakers and especially House Representatives do not 
have the needed staff to ensure they successfully carry out the demands of the American public.   
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
Congress had scant staff until the end of World War II and in tandem with the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946. The LRA of 1946 provided for committee staff. It also created the 
entity that would later be called the Congressional Research Service, which employed 
permanent, nonpartisan staff.51 The year 1921 saw the establishment of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). It was not until after World War II that its jurisdiction expanded 
dramatically to monitor the executive branch.52 Staff sizes across Congress again grew 
substantially in the 1970s. Both instances were responses to the belief on Capitol Hill that the 
executive branch had become too powerful and the legislative branch needed to build its 
capacity to serve as a proper check on executive power.53 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970 mainly focused on shifting power among lawmakers but also grew staff capacity. The LRA 
added additional committee staff. The bill gave to CRS its name, greater autonomy from the 
                                                          
51 Roger H. Davidson, “The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
15, no. 3: 357-73 (1990), http://www.jstor.org/stable/439768.  
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “About GAO: History – At a Glance,” https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-is/history/.  
53 Susan Webb Hammond, “Life and Work on the Hill: Careers, Norms, Staff, and Informal Caucuses” in Congress Responds to the 
Twentieth Century, eds. Sunil Ahuja and Robert E. Dewhirst (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003), 73-96. 
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Library of Congress, expanded responsibilities, and tripled its staff size.54 The Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established the CBO. This bill was also a response 
to executive power. Specifically, it was a backlash against President Nixon’s refusal to spend 
congressionally appropriated funds.55 The Office of Technology Assessment was also created in 
the 1970s, to provide expertise on technology. By the end of the 1970s and through the 1990s, 
congressional staffing levels plateaued and sometimes contracted. In this new era, different 
ideas about congressional capacity and staffing had begun to increase.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, then-Minority Whip Newt Gingrich leveraged emerging 
media platforms to propagate a messaging campaign attacking the Federal government, 
especially the elected members in the U.S. House of Representatives.56 He successfully 
convinced voters that his compatriots were corrupt and to “Throw the bums out.” His campaign 
was successful, and the 1994 midterm elections saw the Republicans retake control of the U.S. 
House for the first time in forty years, dubbed the ‘Republican Revolution.’57 Now the Speaker of 
the House, Gingrich quickly acted on his promises to reform the House and undertook efforts to 
reshape the chamber, including those that impacted staff. Although some conservatives 
disagree, there is a broad consensus that Gingrich changed the House to consolidate his power 
and reign in what he believed to be the excesses of government emanating from the First 
Branch.   His actions caused lasting harm to the House by weakening its institutional capacity 
including the staff. He cut by a third the staff on House Committees, the GAO, and the CRS.  In 
1995 Speaker Gingrich consolidated issue areas in CRS.58 He closed the OTA. Gingrich fired the 
                                                          
54 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization of the Congress United States House of 
Representatives: Final Report, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., December 1993, https://archives-democrats-
rules.house.gov/Archives/jcoc2.htm.  
55 PG Joyce, “The Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Power, and Policymaking,” Public Budgeting and Finance, 32: 102-
105 (2011): 18. 
56 Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the 
New Politics of Extremism, 2nd ed. (New York City: Basic Books, 2012). 
57 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006). 




non-partisan House Historian and his four staff in 2005 and appointed the replacement who 
immediately resigned. Gingrich refused to select a new historian. The position remained vacant 
for a decad. Gingrich rearranged the committee structure to consolidate power and dissuaded 
Representatives and their staff from conducting policy research.59 In 1995, House Resolution Six 
terminated the ability of House Caucuses to fund shared employees, another reservoir of issue 
expertise.60 The new Majority began to hire lobbyists and others from the private sector to fill 
staff positions so they could write legislation, among other duties. Lobbyists also began to serve 
as expert witnesses and provide briefings and reports.61 As a result of these actions, expertise 
and power shifted from Congress to the Influence Industry. 
These capacity reductions have broadly remained to today and in many ways 
intensified. By 2014, both the GAO and CRS possessed about 80 percent capacity to that in 1979. 
By 2012, senior staff positions in CRS had remained vacant for 15 years.62 By 2009, every House 
Standing Committee had less staff than it did in 1979. After the 2010 midterm elections, the 
GOP became the Majority party in the House. Incited by the Tea Party, the House GOP cut 
Congress’s budget by 20 percent, resulting in staff layoffs and freezes on hiring and salaries. 
Congressional scholar Lorelei Kelly referred to these efforts, which began in the 1990s, as 
Congress’s “self-lobotomy.” She and other scholars have noted that lobbyists have increasingly 
filled Congress’s gap in expertise.63 She stated that previously “Congress operated one of the 
world’s premier scientific advisory bodies…” and “maintained an extensive network of shared 
expert staff--individuals and entities that comprised deep pools of both subject matter and 
legislative process expertise.” Now Congress’s main source of information is from outside 
entities, often with profit motives or well-organized advocacy strategies. House Caucuses now 
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have minimal staff. Rather than providing “big picture” and specialized expertise as in times 
past, Caucuses now mainly provide information to boost short-term political goals.64  
The Democrats successfully replicated Gingrich’s strategy in the 2006 midterms and ran 
against the “corrupt Majority” to win back control of the House. The GOP did the same in the 
2010 midterms to retake the House.65 The Democratic party successfully used the same strategy 
to win control of the House in November 2018. 66 It has become well-established that running 
against Washington, D.C. is a winning campaign strategy. Elected officials make efforts to 
demonstrate how they are attacking the D.C. “establishment,” cutting the bloat to save taxpayer 
dollars, and refusing to become intoxicated by “Potomac Fever.” Many lawmakers now proudly 
return tax dollars from their Member Representational Allowance (MRA)—the budget which 
funds their office operations—to the U.S. Treasury. Savings are sometimes accomplished by 
sleeping in their office and cutting staffing expenditures by paying low salaries or restricting 
hiring. As Congress grows more dysfunctional and inept voters only become more angry. This 
further incentivizes campaigners and politicians to channel Gingrich’s anti-government strategy 
to diminish Congress’s capacity further. It has become a cyclical, self-perpetuating feedback-
loop and downward spiral. When in power, Democrats in the House failed to replenish the 
staffing capacity. While the American public has always had a healthy skepticism toward 
Congress, public opinion has continued a steady decline since the 2000s. Approval rates have 
hardly broken above 20 percent in the past decade.67 The common American perception that 
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the federal government is “bloated” extends to the legislative branch and the belief that 
Congress spends too much money on itself, including its staff.68  
Thus, Congress has struggled to counteract the inertia toward reducing or freezing 
congressional capacity. Nevertheless, Congress faces an increasing volume of issues that grow 
ever more complex. Notably, there is an exception to the trend toward small offices: The 
Speaker’s office staff has expanded in recent years.69 This is in tandem with the continued 
consolidation of power in the House Speaker as initiated by Gingrich. However, there has been a 
growing effort among think tanks and members on Capitol Hill—including among Republicans—
to restore congressional capacity, especially staffing.70  
POLICY PROPOSAL 
The goal of the policy proposal is to rebuild policy staff capacity in the House and three 
congressional support offices. Under this proposal, the House Administration Committee will 
establish a hiring program that will serve as a pipeline to funnel policy talent and government 
Subject Matter Experts into the Legislative branch. Each year, the House Administration 
Committee will select 150 graduating students of Masters programs and 150 graduating 
students from Doctoral programs, a total of 300 people. These individuals will be deemed 
“Residents” will be graduates of accredited public policy or public administration programs. 
They will serve in a House Standing Committee, Member Personal Office, CBO, CRS, or GAO in a 
policy role. They will work on Capitol Hill and may not work in a district office. Residents must 
also have a professional background that includes at least three years of working experience in 
the federal executive branch.  Applicants must have an expressed interest in long-term 
employment in Congress, especially the House or the three support offices. They each would 
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serve for a 1-year residency in the House. By the end of the residency, they would have the 
opportunity to interview and work with any House personal or committee office, or one of the 
three congressional support offices, CRS, GAO, or CBO.  
 Policy and public administration graduates of master’s programs would receive a salary 
equivalent to that of a GS-9, Step 1 federal job in the executive branch for that calendar year. In 
CY2019, this was $57,51071 for the Washington-Baltimore-Arlington area (DC Metro). GS-9 is the 
first grade level in which OPM recommends that applicants possess a Master’s Degree. The total 
cost for 150 GS-9 positions is $8,626,500. Candidates with a Ph.D. will earn a GS-11, Step 1. This 
was $69,581 in CY19.72 GS-11 is the first grade level in which OPM recommends that applicants 
possess a Doctorate. The total expenditure for 150 GS-11 positions for one year is $10,437,150. 
The total cost for the 300 Residents in CY2019 would be $19,063,650.  The annual salary of the 
new cohort of Residents would increase in tandem with any inflation-adjusted pay raises 
received by federal employees. Such raises are administered by OPM when Congress provides 
needed appropriations. In the past decade (since 2009), the average inflation-based pay raise 
per year was 1.93 percent. This average excludes 2011 to 2013 which did not see raises. If we 
operate this Residency program from 2020 through 2025 and incorporate an annual 1.93 
percent pay raise, the total program cost during that period will be $122,361,786. 
 Across several years, the program will incorporate a more significant percentage of 
policy staff into the staffing at-large. Suppose that from 2020 through 2025, 100 percent of the 
annual cohorts of 300 Residents are then hired and retained as permanent staff in the House. 
This would total 1,800 staffers. Let us further suppose that professional House staff remains at 
CRS’s latest count of 9,42073. In this case, former-Residents would constitute 19.11 percent of 
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the total House staff. Nearly one in five House staff would be a former Resident. This is a 
substantive shift. Further suppose that we incorporate the staffing of CBO (235), GAO (2,989), 
and CRS (609).74 Adding this additional 3,833 staff to the 9,420 House staff totals 13,283—the 
1,800 former-Residents would constitute 13.6 percent of this total. This is also a notable change. 
 The proposal draws inspiration from established congressional fellowship programs. The 
program title is a “Residency” for several reasons. One is to distinguish it from other similar 
programs. The title also indicates that the individual is in a post-training stage of ‘practice,’ that 
includes supervision, in preparation for unrestricted ability to work in the ‘field of policymaking’ 
after the Residency concludes. The title also suggests that the individual is meant to stay in 
Congress rather than move to another organization.  
 Leader Pelosi, you will encourage House offices to hire the candidates during and after 
their Residency. House Administration Committee staff will aid Residents in securing post-
Residency placements. During their residency and subsequently, the Residents would not be 
permitted to conduct duties related to constituent services or communications. Instead, they 
would be strongly encouraged to work on policy, legislation, or oversight of the executive 
branch. The goal is that by January 2026, the program will have contributed at least a total of 
1,800 staff—with expertise in policy and public management—to House committees and 
personal offices or the three support offices. This would result from an annual incoming class of 
300 unique residents for each of the six years from CY 2020 through CY 2025.  
Policy Authorization Tool 
The legislative branch Appropriations Act of 2020 would authorize the Residency program. 
While including authorizing language in appropriations measures is a non-traditional practice, it 
has become a common tactic to enact legislation in the face of perpetual congressional gridlock. 
You should request that the Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the legislative 
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branch incorporate the language into the base bill, rather than introduce it as an amendment. 
You should encourage lawmakers on the subcommittee and full committee to speak in favor of 
the program during the markup and during floor action. Ideally, a House Republican will also 
speak in favor of the proposal. The House Appropriations Committee often has moderate and 
bi-partisan-minded GOP Representatives so this panel may be the first and best place to seek 
out such support. That said, it may be impossible to find bipartisan support in such politically 
divisive times. 
See Appendix A for the proposed legislative language. 
Policy Implementation Tool 
Upon enactment of the language, the House Administration Committee would schedule a 
business meeting and markup to promulgate an interim rule to direct implementation of the 
program. Upon completion of the first year of the program, the House Administration 
Committee would promulgate a final rule. There would be no additional costs associated with 
the implementation of this program beyond that outlined in the previous section of this memo.  
See Appendix C for the proposed regulatory language.  
POLICY ANALYSIS 
The policy analysis section of this memo presumes the following conditions will persist for the 
foreseeable future: Fiscal constraints on federal appropriations; Voter distrust of the Federal 
executive and legislative branches; Key segments of House Republicans backing efforts that 
reduce or cap funding to Congress; Inter-party hostility.   
Pros 
One.   
Programs that have broadly similar dimensions, requirements, purposes, and funding levels 
show demonstrated success. This indicates that the Residency program could become a reality 
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and survive the test of time. Crucially, it appears that Congress has an appetite for funding in-
house fellowships.  
  Bill Emerson National Hunger Fellowship: The Washington, D.C.-based Congressional Hunger 
Center (CHC), which “works to make …hunger…a priority to policymakers in the U.S. 
government”75 has maintained the Bill Emerson National Hunger Fellowship for nearly 26 years. 
Each year, the program places a new class of sixteen to twenty Fellows in U.S. Congress, among 
other governmental and not-for-profit organizations. Incumbents work on policy, program 
development, and research, according to the work plan they developed.76  Congress authorizes 
and funds the program, mainly through the Farm Bill and the annual appropriations process, 
usually about $2.5 million a year.77 Congress appropriated $3 million for fiscal years 2003 and 
2004 for the sixteen to twenty Emerson Fellows and twelve to fifteen Mickey Leland Hunger 
Fellowship, a sister program which places incumbents oversees.  Congress provided $2.5 million 
for FY2006.  CHC pays them a “living wage,” up to $43,000. Applicants must have a bachelor’s 
degree and secure their own health insurance. The statute requires audits of the program.78 A 
2009 evaluation of the program determined that it had “stood the tests of time,” was “highly-
regarded,” and a “sought-after leadership development opportunity.”79 Fellows serve in the 
House or Senate.  
  Wounded Warrior Fellowship: The program places honorably discharged, combat-wounded 
veterans in the U.S. House for two years. Congress established the program in 200880. The 
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program places Fellows in either Capitol Hill or district offices. They must have a high-school 
degree and, ideally, at least completed some college coursework. Candidates must have reached 
the military grade of E-5 or O-3. They may work on any number of projects, including 
constituent requests or policy and legislation. The stated purpose is to establish employment for 
veterans in the U.S. House. “Wherever possible, those selected for the program will be given the 
opportunity to transition into full-time employment,” although such employment is not a 
guarantee.81 For at least a decade, Congress has regularly appropriated at least $2.5 million 
annually to fund the program.8283 In Fall 2018, Congress enacted appropriations legislation with 
an amendment to increase funding from $2.75 million to $3 million84. At that time, there were 
about 50 active Fellows. The funding was intended to help the program get closer to reaching 
the ultimate goal of 110 paid positions.85 We can deduce the average salary per Fellow. If $2.75 
million funds 50 positions, the average salary would be $55,000. A search of USAJobs (online) 
yields job postings with consistently the same salary range of $39,000 to $52,000.86 Salary levels 
depend on experience and the recommendation of the hiring office. If $36,944 constitutes a 
living wage in the DC Metro Area87, then these salaries appear to be sufficient, particularly for 
new staffers.  
The House Chief Administrative Office administers and oversees the program, which suggests 
that the House has the necessary capacity to maintain such a program across many years 
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successfully. Most incumbents work in district offices and commonly serve as a community 
liaison and conduct casework for current and former military personnel in the district. 
  Brookings Institution LEGIS Congressional Fellowship: This fellowship program places 
incumbents on Capitol Hill for seven or twelve month periods. Federal employees comprise the 
majority of Fellows. The LEGIS Fellowship has existed for over 20 years. A central purpose of the 
experience is to enable the Fellow to develop legislative skills and intimate knowledge of 
policymaking in Congress. This further suggests that policy-based fellowships on Capitol Hill can 
be successful over the long-term. Placements may be in committees or personal offices. Fellows 
serve in Capitol Hill offices only. Candidates must be at least a GS-13. The federal department or 
agency of origin continues to pay the incumbent’s salary during the fellowship. Each participant 
must also pay a tuition of $4,525 or $6,135 for the 7 and 12-month stints, respectively.  Like the 
Hunger Fellowship, the program includes training sessions and briefings.  
 In conclusion, these three programs are broadly similar to the Residency Program 
proposal in terms of purpose, scope, and cost. Crucially, they have endured for years. This 
suggests that the proposed Residency program could fair similarly.  
Two.   
There is a high likelihood that improved staffing will yield improved legislative outcomes. There 
are two ways to draw such a conclusion: 
(A) An examination of U.S. Congress demonstrates the efficacy of robust staffing.  
After Gingrich dramatically cut committee staff, the number and quality of hearings dropped. 
This was especially notable in oversight and appropriations committees. It is reasonable to 
suppose that a reversal of those cuts would dramatically improve the number and quality of 
hearings.88 In fact, in the 1960s there was a concerted effort to build congressional capacity and 
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expertise by growing the number of staffers, especially at the CRS and CBO. The benefits were 
obvious: The number of committee meetings grew by 80 percent in the House and 50 percent in 
the Senate through the 1970s. The1960s and 1970s were “the great eras of congressional 
oversight.” Most famous were the Watergate hearings, of course. Congress’s policy expertise 
blossomed during this time as lawmakers were able to cultivate mastery of both policy and 
process as a result of staffing capacity. They were able to enact precisely calibrated legislation to 
address convoluted and weighty societal problems from water pollution to Soviet Union human 
rights abuses89.  Recently, researchers at the Center for Effective Lawmaking based at the 
University of Virginia conclusively determined that U.S. Representatives were able to “advance 
more (and more significant) legislation when they retain a more experienced legislative 
staff…”.90 Finally, Joshua McCrain wrote a research paper that won a Malcolm Jewell Award in 
which he identified a positive correlation between a U.S. Representative’s legislative efficacy 
and the total experience of his or her staff.91  
(B) International legislative branches demonstrate the efficacy of robust staffing. 
International legislatures see positive outcomes from robust or expanded staff capacity. 
Relatedly, researchers have repeatedly determined inadequate staffing to be a source of 
dysfunction in parliaments worldwide. These assertions are discussed below. There appears to 
be an international reckoning that legislative branches need professional staff to achieve 
successful lawmaking, placing the American efforts within the context of a broader, global shift. 
A survey of legislative staff around the globe appears to indicate shifts toward more robust 
staffing, to positive effect. Parliaments across the world have made concerted efforts in recent 
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decades to “professionalize” their staff.92 Over sixty-one percent of surveyed parliamentarians 
stated that problems with office resources and staffing hindered their effectiveness either a 
“Great Deal” (30.1 percent) or a “Fair Amount” (31.7 percent).93  
 Although still somewhat anecdotal, there may be a correlation between the economic 
development of a country and the amount of time the legislature spends on casework versus 
policymaking.94 Lawmakers in both Lower Developed Countries (LDC’s) and newer democracies 
shared stories of personal phones ringing nonstop, spending entire days in back-to-back 
meetings with constituents regarding their individualized requests, and of lines of citizens 
queuing outside their private homes to discuss personal grievances.95 In African and Arab 
countries, lawmakers told of converting their legal practices and staff into ad-hoc constituency 
offices to field the influx of requests.96 Some LDC’s have created Constituency Development 
Funds (CDFs), which are pots of money intended to end the practice of lawmakers using their 
personal funds to respond to constituent entreaties.97 While national parliamentarians across all 
democracies are facing growing casework demands, the picture of developed countries 
indicates a smaller volume and requests that are more often policy-based, like local 
infrastructure needs.98 In high-poverty countries, “ most politicians regarded legislating as ‘an 
indulgence,’ something secondary to their main role of providing services to voters.”99 However, 
lawmakers in such countries have begun to shift focus from casework to policymaking, often as 
a result establishing or strengthening offices of policy researchers.100 OECD countries broadly 
have more staff and spend more on that staff than do Lesser Developed Countries (LCD).101  
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 A USAID study of various legislatures in LDC’s concluded that a central reason for 
“ineffective” legislating is ‘inadequately prepared’ legislators and staff.102 To the point, one 
principal cause of “legislative problems” was too few staff or existing staff without “knowledge 
needed to carry out duties.” This conclusion extended to oversight duties and personnel tasked 
with monitoring the executive branch.  A key recommendation was ensuring “adequacy in skill 
and number of legislative staff and administration.”103 In the early 1990s, Rep. Martin Frost (D-
TX) partnered with the CRS to lead the Frost-Solomon Task Force to develop legislative branches 
in newly formed democracies in Eastern European countries. A key recommendation was 
building staffing for committees. In 2005, the U.S. House and USAID established a successor 
endeavor, the House Democracy Partnership. This project developed, among other strategies, 
training programs for legislative staff.104  
 A 2008 examination of the Ghanaian Parliament determined that inadequate staffing—
defined by nepotism, lack of expertise, an overabundance of administrative staff, and short 
workdays--was a leading cause of poor lawmaking.105 A 2006 review of the Australian and British 
Parliaments concluded there was a definite need for professional staff to achieve policy 
success.106 In South Africa in 1994, a key impediment for the new President Nelson Mandela was 
a legislature with insufficient staffing capacity.107 A 2012 analysis of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council (a unicameral legislature) recommended that staffing capacity be improved to enhance 
                                                          
102  U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Democracy and Governance, February 2000), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/200sbb.pdf.  
103 Ibid. 
104 House Democracy Partnership, U.S. House of Representatives, House Democracy Partnership at Ten Years: Findings and 
Considerations (Washington, D.C.: House Democracy Partnership, 2016),  
https://hdp.house.gov/sites/housedemocracypartnership.house.gov/files/HDP-Tenth-Anniversary-Full-Published-Version.pdf  
105 Staffan I. Lindberg and Yongmei Zhou, "The rise and decline of parliament in Ghana," Legislatures in Emerging Democracies 
(October 2008), http://users.clas.ufl.edu/sil/downloads/Lindberg_in_Barken_ed2008.pdf.  
106 Kate Jones, “One Step at a Time: Australian Parliamentarians, Professionalism and the Need for Staff,” Parliamentary Affairs vol. 
59, Issue 4 (October 2006): 638–653, https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsl015.  
107 Richard Calland and Mandy Taylor, “Parliament and the Socio-Economic Imperative - What Is the Role of the National Legislature, 
Law, Democracy and Development,” Law Democracy and Development 1 (November 1997): 193-220,  
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/laacydev1&div=15&id=&page=#heinonline.   
24 
 
legislative performance.108 Congressional expert Lee Drutman concludes that in U.S. Congress, 
current staffing conditions and their outcomes may soon be more akin to “Brazil and Mexico” 
than “Germany or Denmark, ” if not the case already.109  
Three.   
The proposal implicitly includes an annual inflation-based or cost of living rise in the salary. The 
salary links to the OPM-determined salary for a GS-9, Step 1 and GS-11, Step 1 positions in the 
DC Metro Area110 for the given year. This salary incorporates not only the high living expenses of 
the D.C. metro area but also the annual inflation-adjustments enjoyed by career federal 
employees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) publishes and administers the 
increases when Congress provides the needed yearly appropriations. The proposal also reflects 
the OPM guidance for applicant credentials: GS-9 and Gs-11 are the first grade levels in which 
new applicants are recommended to have a master’s or doctoral degree, respectively.111 As 
discussed earlier, there is a shortage of staff on Capitol Hill with education beyond a bachelor’s 
degree, let alone a doctorate. This proposal would remediate this specific deficiency.  
 Beyond providing a living wage for the Residents, there is evidence suggesting that 
raising some wages may spur salaries to increase among additional workers not directly 
impacted. We should note that this body of evidence is not a direct correlate to the Residency 
proposal’s inflation-adjusted income. Nonetheless, it suggests some promising conclusions. For 
example, a rise in the minimum wage generally causes a “ripple effect” in that workers earning 
slightly more also see increased salaries. This effect is “generally well recognized in the 
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academic literature.”112 This observation is most immediately apparent in states that raise the 
minimum wage beyond the national benchmark.113 It is true that the Residency proposal does 
not establish a minimum salary across House staff, but instead annually inserts fifty new staff--
with living wages--into the chamber. A central cause of the ripple effect is the need for 
employers to compete for talent.114 Thus, Residents could contribute slightly to wage pressure 
via hiring competition. In sum, the proposal addresses multiple dimensions of the staffing 
problems: Increased salaries which may raise other staffers salaries, increased education levels 
among staff, and increased expertise and experience levels among staff. 
Four.   
This proposal is not a mandate. This fact bodes well for gathering support from lawmakers or at 
least averting their dissent. By contrast, there are requirements in the executive branch that 
certain federal positions provide minimum salaries and that candidates demonstrate specific 
credentials or background. In contrast, each congressional office establishes all requirements for 
hiring, managing, and firing staff115. Thus, a proposal that imposes requirements on 
congressional offices is unlikely to gain support. Instead, the plan creates a pipeline of 
employees with public policy and administration experience and academic training. Lawmakers 
would have the choice to hire the candidates during or after the Residency. Such a program is 
unlikely to confront the same resistance as would any proposals that would establish 
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One.   
Attaining the additional $20 million each year may be challenging. The challenge is due to 
decades-long federal fiscal constraints in the aftermath of repeated tax cuts and spending 
increases. In addition to ongoing budgetary problems, recent years have culminated in regular 
continuing resolutions, omnibus spending packages, government shutdowns, and showdowns 
over budget caps.  These realities present challenging environments for new funding proposals. 
This year especially may be challenging as Budget Caps are again in play. The caps will apply to 
fiscal years 2020 and 2021.116 It may be even more challenging for offices to hire the Residents 
as permanent staff. As a permanent staff, their salaries will draw from the same funding sources 
as any other staff. As staff to personal offices, they will count toward the eighteen-person 
limitation. It may be difficult to absorb a new cohort of staff every year, particularly those who 
may expect a decent salary and expect to work primarily on policy issues.  
Two.   
The cost is considerable. As with most organizations, staffing disproportionately consumes the 
chamber’s operating budget.117 Indeed, it may be cheaper to train existing staff. Paul Ryan and 
Kevin McCarthy published a report entitled A Better Way. In the document, they proposed 
training to build staffing capacity. For example, under one proposal, “the Committee on House 
Administration should coordinate with the Office of Legislative Counsel and convene seminars 
for Member offices and, separately, for committee staff on bill drafting.” Such in-house 
undertakings, in which costs are presumably absorbed under existing operations, may find more 
support among lawmakers wary of proposals that require new funding. A study mentioned 
above reached another, similarly lower-cost conclusion: “This finding suggests that a targeted 
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strategy to retain the most experienced legislative staff in Congress may pay the greatest 
dividends in regard to lawmaking.”118 
Three.  
Current Hill staffers may personally feel affronted at the implication that they are ill-equipped 
for their jobs and believe this effort intends to put them out of a job. Therefore, they may work 
to undermine the proposal or at least not actively work to ensure its success. The proposal may 
lower morale among existing staff, who are already overworked and underpaid. Indeed, an R 
Street proposal to improving staffing on appropriations committees began by vigorously 
complimenting current appropriations staffers.119 If messaging is any less disciplined, staff may 
feel insulted by the proposal. They may become demoralized or worry about losing their jobs. 
Such sentiments may cause them to leave Congress, thus exacerbating the staffing churn and 
exodus to K Street.  
 
Four.   
A solution that merely grows the number of staffers without regard 
to expertise is unlikely to replenish capacity. The U.S. Congress 
already has the largest number of staffs of any legislative branch 
throughout the world.120 The staff is the largest in terms of raw 
count (15,907 in 2012) and the proportion of staff to Member 
(29.73 per “Parliamentarian”). Additionally, a study above from the 
Center for Effective Lawmaking which correlated staff experience 
to legislative outcomes, also concluded that legislators generally do 
not gain benefit from merely having a large number of staffers.   
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One.    
An increase in congressional capacity can help Congress enact the demands of the American 
people. As lawmaking improves, voters are likely to more readily trust in and approval of the 
federal government, including Congress. Voters that have greater trust in and approval for 
government tend to prefer Democrats over Republicans. This is demonstrated by the fact that 
Republicans tend to have markedly less trust in the federal government than do Democrats. A 
2010 survey showed that 52 percent of Republicans stated they “never” trusted Washington to 
“do what is right.” Only about 13 percent of Democrats agreed.121 A 2015 Pew Research Center 
poll found that people who are strong or ‘lean’ Republican are “angry” with government three 
times as much as Democrats: 32 percent versus 12 percent.122 In sum, dissatisfaction appears to 
be a central impetus in driving voters to the GOP. As described earlier, Republicans played an 
active role in cultivating this voter base by stirring a distrust in government and thus persuading 
voters to choose GOP candidates.123 Indeed, the GOP has become “the dominant practitioners 
of the ‘attack government’ strategy” to not only win office but also achieve policy goals, 
impower and win support from their network of institutions and organizations.124 Paul Glastris 
and Haley Sweetland Edwards of the Washington Monthly plainly state that scandals involving 
government failings—like the launch of healthcare.gov—“wind up perversely advancing the 
conservative anti-government agenda—another reason why many Republicans do not worry 
much about the brain drain on the Hill.”125  
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There is possibly a straightforward message that resonates with skeptical voters, should the 
proposal be thrust into public debate: “Congress is broken,” “Congress is weak (vis a vis special 
interests and the White House),” and “Congress is stupid.” These messages have aligned with 
voter sentiment for years and, as previously discussed, have been a winning campaign strategy. 
Hence the message that Congress needs capacity growth to ‘be less stupid.’ This proposal may 
not be enacted in-full this year. However, an initial push for this proposal may allow for at least 
a pilot. Congress could enact the proposal in tandem with a rise in the national minimum wage 
should the Democrats take control of the White House and both chambers of Congress. 
Americans may be amenable to “a raise for Congress” if they are simultaneously getting a raise--
this message may be especially persuasive to voters that earn minimum wage and also think 
Congress is bloated.  
 Additionally, the program merely presents a choice. “Choice” is a popular buzzword in 
Republican circles, used to advance myriad proposals from those related to veterans’ health 
care to public education. Further, if a Resident does not perform at the level needed to secure 
long-term employment, she will no longer be in Congress after twelve months. The 
appropriations are provided on an annual basis, and there will be additional opportunities to 
review the program. Nothing about the program suggests an imposition. 
Three.  
Democratic offices may hire Residents more readily than Republican offices. This will inevitably 
cause more staffing capacity to accrue to the House Democrats. While the program intends for 
Residents and post-Residents to split between the parties evenly, the GOP has indicated they do 
not appreciate the benefit of increased funding and expertise in the Legislative branch. We 
should note that the Residents program will provide the most significant benefit to Congress 
and policymaking outcomes when both parties hire Residents in equivalent numbers. This is 
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because both parties will have the technical expertise to hammer out particularized policy 
compromises that incorporate the myriad views of disparate lawmakers. However, the GOP may 
yet again reject an effort to build congressional capacity and therefore hire few Residents. In 
this instance, while such a rejection may make it harder to achieve policy compromises as 
frequently, it will likely improve political outcomes for House Democrats who will be better 
equipped during all political debates and policy compromises on Capitol Hill.  
Cons 
One.  
The Republican Party--and its extended network of think tanks, commentators, donors, and 
activists--would likely oppose the effort. They may leverage the proposal as a campaign issue 
should it suit a broader messaging strategy. This could be a hurdle to successfully advancing the 
proposal. Many voices on the Right have criticized congressional staff as constituting federal 
bloat: Executive Vice President of Cato Institute David Boaz has focused on “congressional 
bonuses” earned by Hill staff of both parties.126 He argues that ‘hidden bonuses’ enable staff to 
surreptitiously earn salaries seventeen to fifty percent higher than generally believed.127 A 
Former Cato Senior Fellow argued that more than being overpaid, the “real problem” is the 
excessive number of congressional staff.128 In the mid-1990s, in tandem with Gingrich’s attacks 
on the institution, the Heritage Foundation published works arguing for “Cutting Congress Down 
To Size”129 or “Reforming the Imperial Congress.”130 These reports advocated for reduced 
capacity in Congress, including a reduced staff size: Congressional staffing was “huge” and 
earned “a plethora of perks.” Voters were encouraged to demand that Congress “end the perks 
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and cut the staff.” Staffers “generate their own agendas” and run Congress, rather than the 
Representatives “elected to do the job.” This excess was alleged to be particularly pronounced 
among committee staff.131  
Indeed, Republicans may find the proposal useful in political messaging, including during 
campaigns. In building momentum for a presidential run in 2011, Rick Perry advanced his 
“Uproot and Overhaul Washington” plan.132 He argued for fewer congressional staff. Beyond 
providing casework for constituents, they were of little use, Perry argued. He further asserted 
that because the Founders undertook the Declaration of Independence, the American 
Revolution, and the U.S. Constitution without “thousands of paid staffers,” then there was no 
need for staffers in today’s Congress. Republicans may find a resonant message in denouncing 
the Democrats as wanting to increase the size and pay for an already bloated congressional staff 
comprised of elitist, DC-insiders.  
 However, there are Republicans that have pushed against these tendencies. Senator 
Tom Coburn has heralded GAO for saving tax dollars by identifying “a mother lode of 
government waste and duplication.”133 There is also a broader reckoning among many 
Republicans and their allies that Congress needs restored capacity. In early 2016, 
Conservative Mike Lee (R-UT) established the Article I Project focused on “congressional 
rehabilitation” to take back power from the executive branch. Joining him was a cadre of 
conservatives, including Senator Jeff Flake and Representatives Mia Love, Dave Brat, Barry 
Loudermilk, Mark Walker, Gary Palmer, Cynthia Lummis, and John Ratcliffe. Senator Lee 
adroitly couched the project within a conservative worldview and talking points.134 As 
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mentioned earlier, Paul Ryan’s A Better Way recommended training staff. Even the 
Heritage Foundation has bemoaned the consequences of the Gingrich overhaul and hinted 
at the problems inherent to the resultant staff reductions.135 Conservative commentator 
Luke Rosiak wrote an op-ed in the Washington Times that lamented the low pay and high 
turnover of congressional staff that results in a brain-drain.136 He quoted a Republican 
former Senate staffer, a Heritage Fellow, and conservative commentator, each who derided 
shortsighted cuts to congressional staffing that ultimately produce waste. The R Street 
Institute is a conservative think tank that advocates for a “limited, effective government.” 
Nonetheless, it is at the center of the effort to reform Congress and rebuild its capacity, 
including pushing for increased funding.137 On balance, a minority of voices in the 
Republican party support growing congressional capacity. Efforts to rebuild staffing—like 
this Residents proposal--will need to withstand and counteract the opposition. However, 
such efforts will also need to adeptly leverage the smaller number of conservative and 
nonpartisan supporters.  
Two.  
The Influence Industry will likely resist efforts to enhance Congressional staffing capacity. The 
existence of in-house expertise would undermine the monopoly held by lobbyists. The Influence 
Industry has previously resisted attempts to sideline their influence, including efforts to build 
congressional capacity.138 For example, some argue that “Lobbying is an Honorable Profession” 
due to the expertise the industry brings to policymakers.139 An additional argument is that 
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lobbying is a “legislative subsidy” since private interests provide funding. Beyond moralistic 
arguments, lobbying is an over $3 billion industry. Any industry of that magnitude is shown to 
vigorously defend its profit-making on Capitol Hill, particularly those same individuals whose 
trade is to make those very arguments. Indeed their very business model and reason for 
existence rely on the reality that overworked and underprepared staff have no choice but to 
turn to lobbyists for information.140  
Three. 
The two concerns above lead to a more significant issue, which is that the American public 
largely disapproves of Congress and may punish lawmakers that vote to expand staffing capacity 
by voting them out. However, Lee Drutman—advocate for expanding capacity—points out that 
the public already thinks Congress is growing its staff and regularly providing salary raises.141 He 
shows that 92 percent of respondents thought there were too many congressional staffers. 
Drutman argues that this justifies growing staff and paying them more because the public 
already thinks it is occurring. He further points out that despite the Republican messaging in 
support of cutting funding for Congress, public opinion remains unchanged rather than 
becoming more supportive of such cuts. Drutman concludes that messaging about funding for 
Congress does not pierce public consciousness, so perhaps neither will any legislators’ public 
criticism of increased funding for staff.  
Four.  
The proposal may be politically intimidating to lawmakers due to the cost. The roughly $20 
million in annual funding may seem too expensive for many lawmakers of both parties. That 
funding would draw from other policy priorities, or it would increase by $20 million the cost of 
the legislative branch appropriations. In an era of tight fiscal constraints like budget caps, 
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sequestration, perpetual continuing resolutions, shutdowns related to spending fights, and 
conservatives’ salient messaging on government “waste,” new funding may seem a near 
impossibility. However, even if the proposal becomes law without a requisite funding increase, 
the proposal is still impactful. This is because these credentialed and experienced staffers would 
likely supplant staffers that are less skilled or solely focused on casework or communications. As 
a result, the proposal would grow the proportion of policy staff relative to the whole even more 
quickly than if Residents received pay from a separate fund. 
 An effective strategy may be to emphasize that some staff will work in GAO, either 
during their Residency or as their permanent position afterward. Each GAO staffer will more 
than pay back their salary. This is because GAO works to eliminate waste, fraud, duplication, and 
inefficiencies.142 A 2010 Center for American Progress (CAP) report found that every dollar of 
GAO funding saved $15.20 in taxpayer dollars when “agencies acted on GAO information to 
improve services to the public” and up to $80 in savings when GAO work was one of several 
factors for policy change.143 Similarly, the CBO provides cost estimates for proposed legislation. 
This work is necessary to score bills properly. Thus, this program can save tax dollars by 
providing able staffing to these offices. Should the proposal prove especially politically 
challenging for anti-waste lawmakers, a successful compromise may be to dedicate a certain 
proportion of the Residents to GAO, say 5 percent or 10 percent. If--as asserted by CAP and 
Senator Coburn--money invested into GAO ultimately yields more significant long-term savings, 
dedicating Residents to the GAO can presumably build into the Residency program a certain 
measure of “self-funding.”   
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This memo recommends that you pursue this policy. The problem and consequences are 
sufficiently dire to justify an immediate course of action. Little has been done to remedy the 
problem in recent years.  The moment calls for bold, new steps. The current Congress has 
scarcely the capacity to undertake routine matters like passing a budget, never mind the 
sophisticated policymaking modernity requires. Without immediate intervention, the problem 
will continue to worsen. Meanwhile, the dependence on lobbyists will continue to grow, 
contributing to a further decline in American democracy.  
There is scant political will to increase spending on Congress dramatically, and certainly 
not for a sustained number of years as would be necessary to rehabilitate even one of the two 
chambers comprehensively.  Additionally, lawmakers—especially Republicans—similarly chafe 
at any imposed requirements on their personal offices or the committees they chair. Thus a 
requirement that staff be credentialed and experienced, as occurs in the executive branch, is a 
fantasy.  
Therein lies the cleverness of the proposal. It is a backdoor for funneling into the House 
annual cohorts of staffing with both experience, expertise, and education. However, these 
individuals are early enough in their beltway careers that salaries below $60,000 and $70,000—
a princely sum for most beginning Hill staffers--are not nonstarters. Very similar programs have 
been successfully sustained both financially and politically by Congress. Of course, veterans 
seemingly always get congressional support. Perhaps they especially do when they work to 
provide casework to this crucial voting bloc. The issue of hunger is certainly not a topic with an 
outsized set of advocates on K street. Nonetheless, there is a congressional fellowship that has 
lasted over two decades. So perhaps a Residency program to bring “policy and administration” 
expertise to Capitol Hill can likewise enjoy congressional support.  
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There may indeed be pushback from voters, Republicans, Hill staff, and the Influence 
Industry, the latter which seemingly could not be better equipped for just such a fight. They will 
likely struggle to portray an annual increase of 300 staff as a wholesale and radical undertaking. 
After all, hiring a Resident is entirely optional. It is a choice—that is the keyword to use when 
responding to GOP critiques. Regarding the cost, in all likelihood, hiring a former Resident as a 
permanent staffer will draw from existing funding. Moreover, a portion of the Residents can be 
assigned to GAO, where the investment is sure to reap savings. To be sure, Republicans may well 
be able also to make a campaign issue of Democrats “larding up” a bloated Congress with 
overpaid, elitist, beltway insiders. Some voting constituencies may respond to such messaging. 
The Democrats have an equally salient message that draws directly from the GOP messaging: 
Congress is stupid and needs expertise in order to fix these languishing societal problems the 
public wants Congress to address finally. Even if GOP lawmakers reverse tactics and claim that 
Congress is sufficiently talented, the public’s 12 percent approval rating will undoubtedly favor 
the Democrats’ assertion. The most robust messaging strategy is that articulated by Lee 
Drutman in an article headline, “People think Congress is increasing its staff. So Congress might 
as well actually do it.”144 Caseworkers and press secretaries, in particular, may fail to grasp the 
merit of the endeavor. Current lobbyists that provide crucial expertise may work to undermine 
the effort. However, the potential political or policy harms of these immediate challenges will be 
far outweighed by improved policymaking that will weaken the salience of those very 
arguments.  
The Residency provides a year in which a Resident can demonstrate her capabilities, 
produce deliverables and tangible policy outcomes, develop connections, solicit guidance, 
interview for openings, and gain expertise. It is difficult to imagine a better launchpad for a 
permanent posting. Additionally, there is likely to be fierce competition for Residents during 
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their 1-year stint as they will cost nothing to the hosting office. It is quite likely that the hosting 
office will, in turn, hire the Resident at the end of the year. Indeed, this emulates the infamous 
Hill hiring culture of paying staff only after they have worked for free as interns. However, 
oppositional legislators may change their minds once they see the benefit accrued by other 
offices that permanently hire Residents. After all, there is a real and tangible correlation 
between the expertise of staff and legislative outcomes. 
Ultimately, Democrats are more likely to see the benefit of hiring Residents. Thus, the 
party may gain more from the program and therefore develop a competitive edge. That said, 
most benefits will accrue if GOP offices get additional policy expertise. Additional expertise will 
enable them to realize nuanced policy solutions and engage Democratic offices to find political 
compromises, all which is needed to get votes from both parties to enact a law. If the GOP does 
not have the in-house knowledge needed to call the bluffs of K Street and support a bill despite 
lobbyist opposition, then it does not matter how brilliant a Democratic bill may be. 
It may be challenging to find the additional annual funding needed to pay for the 300 
Residents. The challenge may be political if talking point about “larding up congress” gain 
traction. The challenge may be of a policy nature if budget caps forestall any new funding for 
new programs whatsoever. If the program proceeds without funding, the 300 Residents may 
need to be funded from existing appropriations so they will compete for the same limited Hill 
positions as do others. In turn, it may be similarly challenging to place each annual cohort in 
permanent positions without additional funding. In either instance, if Residents are placed 
without additional funding, they may slowly replace less-qualified staff. Either way, this may be 
a blessing in disguise because the proposal would not merely grow the total number of staffs. 
The proportion of Hill staff with relevant education and experience will grow. Recall that a larger 
staffing size alone is unlikely to improve legislative outcomes. It is the aggregate expertise of the 
entire staff that matters most for producing quality policymaking. Assigning a certain proportion 
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of Residents to GAO is possibly a persuasive compromise in the face of opposition to the cost. In 
sum, no matter how the program may be shaped or restrained by political or pecuniary forces, 
the program brings benefit to Congress, and in some instances, to Democrats in particular. 
Indeed, it may be the only feasible course of action for a Congress that seemingly refusing to 
evolve. 
 Ultimately, the moment demands action. Our democracy is under strain. Time is running 
out. With an exploding national debt, a changing climate, historic inequality, and foreign 
intervention in our elections, there is an urgent need for a sophisticated Congress. Without 
action, Congress will continue to deteriorate. Something must be done now to restore the First 
Branch. This may be a solution.   
39 
 
Appendix A: Cost Per Annum; Total Cost Through 2025 
 












Appendix B: Policy Authorization Tool – Proposed Legislative Language 
 
The authorization language is to be included in the FY2020 legislative branch Appropriations bill. 
While traditionally unorthodox, it is now commonplace to see authorizing language in 
appropriations bills. The language would be added after the following text: 
 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; Salaries And Expenses; MEMBERS’ REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCES 
INCLUDING MEMBERS’ CLERK HIRE, OFFICIAL EXPENSES OF MEMBERS, AND OFFICIAL MAIL 
Insert the following,  
Public Policy and Public Administration Residency -- For payments from the allowance 
established under section ___ of this Act for the compensation of public policy and 
administration residents who serve in the offices of Members of the House of Representatives 
or Standing House Committees, $19,431,578. 
Note: The Committee Report could include the recommendation that the House 





H.R. XX – Policy and Public Administration Residency Act 
To establish a Policy and Public Administration Residency Program in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled,  
SECTION 1. Short title. 
This Act may be cited as the “Policy and Public Administration Residency Program of 2020”. 
SEC. 2. Policy and Public Administration Residency Program. 
(a) EST ABL I SHME NT  O F PR OGRA M.—There is established the Public Policy and Public 
Administration Residency Program for the appointment of individuals who are graduates of 
accredited Master’s Degree programs or Doctoral Degree programs in public policy or public 
administration to serve as Congressional Residents in the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 3. Purposes 
(a) In general, the purposes of the Residency Program is 
a. To encourage experienced and credentialed individuals to become 
congressional staff to 
i. Bring crucial skills to the legislative process including, quantitative 
abilities, policy analysis, regulatory expertise; 
ii. Apply extensive knowledge of policy issues, including but not limited to 
those examined in House standing committees; 
iii. Apply practical experience in the federal executive branch to inform 
congressional oversight duties and advise on the executive branch on 
the implementation of laws passed by Congress.  
SEC. 4. Administration 
(a) Selection of Residents.—The Selection Committees shall select Congressional Residents in 
the following manner: 
(1) The Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives shall select 
not less than 150 Congressional Residents with master’s degrees and 150 with doctoral 
degrees, each year for a Residency with an office of the House of Representatives, a 
Standing House Committee, or one of three support offices (Congressional Research 




(b) Selection criteria.—In carrying out subsection (c), the Selection Committees shall select 
Congressional Resident consistent with the following criteria:  
(1) Each Congressional Resident selected shall be a graduate of an accredited master’s 
degree or doctoral degree program in public policy or administration as of the starting 
date of his or her residency. 
(2) Each Congressional Resident selected shall possess— 
(A) a stellar academic record; 
(B) a demonstrated commitment to public service; and 
(C) an expressed interest in pursuing long-term employment in the 
House or the three cited congressional support offices.  
(c) PL ACEMENT  RE QU IREM ENT S.—The Selection Committees shall, to the extent practicable, 
ensure that Congressional Residents selected and placed under this section are apportioned 
equally between majority party and minority party offices. 
(d) Impact of Residency to Employee Count Limitation - The residency positions shall not count 
against the number of employees who may be employed by a Member of the House under 2 
U.S.C. 5321. 
SEC. 5. Oversight 
Under terms stipulated above the Chief Administrative Officer shall 
(A) conduct periodic reviews of the Residency Program;  
(B) submit to the House Speaker a report that describes the activities and outcomes of 
the Residency program; 
SEC. 6. Guidance 
 Under the terms stipulated above the House Administration Committee legislators and 
senior staff shall provide a certain degree of guidance and assistance to Residents through 
regularized communication. 
SEC. 7. Rules 
The Committee on House Administration shall develop and promulgate rules and regulations on 
the administration of the program unless previously undertaken pursuant to preceding 





Appendix C: Policy Implementation Tool – Proposed Regulatory Language 
 
A RESOLUTION  
COMMITTEE RESOLUTION 116-X 
Resolution to Promulgate Interim Regulations Governing House Public Policy and Administration 
Residents  
Be it resolved, that the Committee on House Administration promulgates the following interim 
regulations, pursuant to Section X of Public Law 116-XX. 
Sec. 1 
In the regulations referred to as the “Members’ Congressional Handbook” within “Categories of 
Staff,” insert the following as a new section after the “Temporary Employees” section:   
House Public Policy and Administration Residency Program 
Public Law 116-XX, Section X established an allowance apart from the MRA for 
reimbursement for regular staff. Under this section, a selected Committee or Member 
Office is authorized to expend a dollar amount equivalent to— 
(A) Grade 9, Step 1 Policy Analyst in the executive branch in Washington-
Baltimore-Arlington locality. In CY2019 this was $57,510.   
(B) Grade 11, Step 1 Policy Analyst in the executive branch in Washington-
Baltimore-Arlington locality. In CY2019 this was $69,581. 
Sec. 2 
The Residents should, to the extent practicable, represent a diverse selection of candidates. This 
diversity should reflect a variety of policy interests, academic/professional backgrounds, race 
and ethnic identity, geographic origins, sex/gender, and socioeconomic background. To the 
extent practicable, Residents should be equally divided between the two parties.  
Sec. 3 
The Residents should commit to working on policy or issues related to public management and 
oversight and have an expressed interest in pursuing long-term employment in the House or 
congressional support offices. 
Sec. 4 
The Committee directs the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) to report annually on the outcome 
of the Residency Program and include feedback and suggestions from the offices of the Member 





The Residents shall meet quarterly with leadership staff to the House Administration Committee 
to discuss their work and problem-solve around work challenges. Such meetings may be 
subdivided by political party, at the discretion of Administration Committee staff. This shall 
constitute ‘supervision’ of Residents as they practice policymaking. House Administration 
Members and staff are encouraged to actively assist Residents in securing permanent 
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